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Abstract 
Under various operational conditions, in particular in 
operations other than war (OOTW) or peacekeeping, an intervening 
force, here Blue, must occasionally engage in attrition warfare with 
an opposing force, here Red, that is intermingled with non-
combatants. Desirably, Red armed actives are targeted and not the 
unarmed non-combatants. This paper describes some simple 
Lanchesterian attrition models that reflect a certain capacity of Blue 
to discriminate non-combatants from armed and active Red 
opponents. An explicit extension of the "Lanchester square law'' 
results: Blue's abstinence concerning the indiscriminate shooting of 
civilians mixed with Reds is essentially reflected in a lower Blue 
rate of fire and less advantageous exchange rate. The model applies 
to other situations involving decoys, and reflects the value of a 
discrimination capability. 
1. Introduction 
Mutual attrition on the battlefield has classically been modeled without 
accounting for the possible presence of false targets: decoys of low military value 
intended to divert opponent fire, or even the deliberate dispersal of unarmed 
civilians among armed and active combatants. The latter is a situation that might 
well occur in the operations other than war (OOTW) scenarios anticipated as one 
of the Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) types into which the U.S. or joint 
forces could be drawn. 
The issue to be addressed herein is that of understanding how Red's use of 
decoys, e.g. civilians, for cover, influences Blue's capability to inflict attrition 
upon Red armed active forces, and at what expense in terms of Blue's own 
attrition and the inadvertent attrition inflicted, or wasted, upon such decoys. 
Clearly attrition of human decoys is to be strenuously avoided for humanitarian 
reasons, but also because of its broad impact on world opinion; in some 
circumstances such attrition might well inflame resistance to the extent that the 
civilian population could itself become an active threat. But in order for Blue to 
avoid killing Red-controlled civilians, or less politically-sensitive targets, i.e. to 
avoid wasting time and resources that could otherwise be directed towards 
targeting Red actives, some sacrifice in Blue effectiveness must be accepted. 
We provide here a preliminary set of simple models for quantifying the effect 
of substituting discrimination for pure attrition when false targets are present. It 
will be seen that the effect of accounting for target discrimination power by Blue 
can be reduced to an explicit formula that generalizes the classical Lanchesterian 
~~square law". Elaboration to include more realistic detail induces the need for 
more ambitious numerical work, but the latter is not formidable. Addition of 
Blue various force and Red decoy types, Blue (inanimate/non-human) decoys, 
stochastics, and the aforementioned change of affiliation by Red (or Blue: 
slaughter of Red civilians by Blue forces may induce the latter to either slacken 
their attack, or stimulate greater Red resistance) can all be modeled and 
ultimately quantified. 
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2. Initial, and Simplest, Formulation 
Let 
Ra(t) = number of Red active, attrition-capable, armed military forces at 
timet; 
Rc(t) = number of Red unarmed civilians or other decoys mixed with the 
above at t; 
B(t) = number of Blue active armed forces at t. 
In what follows it is clearly necessary to require B(t) ~ 0, R(t) ~ 0; otherwise 
nonsense results occur. The attrition equations are non-linear. 
Mechanism of combat: the Red actives deplete the Blue actives according to 
aimed-fire (square-law) Lanchester 
dB dt = ""'"PRB(t)Ra(t). (2.0) 
The Blue actives attempt to do the same, but must avoid killing civilians, or 
generally being diverted by decoys. 
2.1 Blue Shoots at First Available Red. 
If a Blue simply picks a target Red at random then, assuming military and 
civilians are well mixed and appear to the Blues in proportion to their numbers, 
he/she targets an active Red with success probabilitysa(t) = Ra(t)j[Ra(t) + Rc(t)], 
so 
(2.1) 
Note that it is to Blue's immediate selfish advantage to discriminate between Red 
actives and civilians, for in the above Ra(t)j[Ra(t)+Rc(t)] can well be 
considerably less than unity, in which case Blue only slowly reduces those 
shooting at him/her. Red civilians are targeted with probability 1- sa(t) = sc(t); 
the results may be quite unacceptable from Blue's viewpoint, and certainly from 
that of Red. This is a low-resolution model: differentiation between Blue force 
3 
types, and coordination of fire capabilities, are important in practice but not 
addressed here. The payoff is a rather explicit analytical result. 
2.2 Blue Possesses Discriminatory Powers. 
Suppose Blue discriminates between Red actives and Red civilians: iaa is the 
probability that Blue can identify a Red active if he acquires one; iac is the 
probability that he mis-identifies it as a decoy (civilian); ica, the probability that a 
decoy (civilian) is mistaken for an active, and icc, the probability of correct 
identification of a decoy (civilian), are defined correspondingly. We hope that iaa 
and icc are near unity, but there may be a substantial cost in time for this 
capability. Now Ra(t)iaa is the (approximate) number of Red actives correctly 
identified at t, while Ra(t)iac is the number incorrectly classed as civilians and not 
shot at, and Rc(t)ica is the number of civilians targeted through misclassification 
error. Then Ra(t)iaa/[Ra(t)iaa + Ra(t)iac + Rc(t)ica + Rc(t)icc] is the fraction (of time 
dt) spent correctly shooting at Red actives, so 
(2.2) 
the above holds because iaa + iac = 1, ica +icc= 1. Notice that the identification 
probabilities icc' etc., could be made time-dependent to represent changes in 
visibility throughout the conflict. We can also write the attrition equation for 
decoys, or civilians: 
dRc = _ (t) Rc(t)ica(t) B(t). 
dt PBR Ra(t) + Rc(t) (2.3) 
The above formulations assume that the Red actives and civilians are well-mixed 
and hence equally likely to be found by a Blue active; however, once found, a 
candidate target can be assessed for relevance, but with error. For now we slough 
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off the time-consuming aspects of this process. A model with more states can 
handle this aspect; see Section 3. 
To move towards actual solutions, divide (2.2) by (2.3): 
(2.4) 
so upon division 
(dRafdt)/(dRcfdt) =. ( )/. () 
( ) ( ) 
laa t lea t . 
Rat Ret 
(2.5) 




Now plug this into equation (2.2): 
(2.8) 
Equations (2.0) and (2.8) constitute a pair of non-linear first-order differential 
equations that can be routinely solved numerically, subject to initial and 
boundary conditions: 0 ~ Ra(t), B(t) ~ Ra(O), B(O). Closed-form analytical solutions 
are practically inaccessible. Divide (2.0) by (2.8): we come up with an equation 
that relates B(t) and Ra(t) that can be integrated explicitly. We anticipate that a 
"generalized square law'' will show itself (no disappointment here!). 
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Proceed to solve for Rain terms of B: 
{t) Ra(t)iaaB(t) 
dRafdt - -PBR Ra(t) + ( Rc{O)/ Ra(O)icafiaa )(Ra(t))icaliaa 
dBfdt - -PRB(t)Ra(t) (2.9) 
Rearranging, 
Assume that PBR(t)/ PRB(t) is independent oft and integrate to get, finally, 
R~(t)- R~{O) + ( Rc(?) . J[Ra(t)(ica/iaa)+1 Ra(O)(ica/iaa)+1] 
2 2 (Ra(o)ycaltaa (ica/iaa)+ 1 (icafiaa)+ 1 
= PBR iaa[B2(t)- B2{0)]· 
PRB 2 2 
(2.11) 
This is a "generalized square law", valid when positive boundary conditions are 
respected. Notice that if Rc(O) = 0 we are back to the original square law, 
immortalized in song and story; see for instance Taylor (1980). If Rc(O) > 0 but 
ica = iaa we also have a new and somewhat different square law. Anderson (1995) 
has also considered the influence of decoys or false targets in a more elaborate 
setting. His formulation differs from ours in that discrimination capability is not 
represented by functions iaa, ica (and their respective complements). 
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illustration 1: ica = iaa, Rc(O) = Ra(O) 
This is a pessimistic case for Blue, who has no discriminatory power. But the 
result is simple: 
or (2.12) 
which is a new square-law result. 
The above is precisely the same equation that would occur if there were no 
civilians (Rc(O) = 0), but with PB& the attrition rate of Blue vs. Red, replaced -
reduced -to PBR iaa/2. In this case the presence of civilians or decoys has diluted 
the Blue force's effectiveness by iaa/2, i.e. by at least a factor of two. Furthermore, 
civilians are still getting targeted and presumably killed since ica = iaa, which, it is 
hoped, is unrealistic in practice. This disadvantage must be overcome by 
sharpening Blue's perception so as to reduce ica well below iaa, which would 
allow return (nearly) to classical attrition formulas. Otherwise, more Blue forces 
would be needed to achieve desired results. 
illustration 2: ica = 0 
This is optimistic for Red civilian non-combatants: they are never targeted. 
Note that (2.11) becomes 
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From this it is apparent that surviving Red attacker number, Ra(t), increases with 
Rc(O), initial decoy supply, as is intuitive: the presence of Red decoys still 
interferes with Blue's effectiveness, even though none are actually engaged. 
Numerical Examples 
Figures 1-3 present the results of numerically solving equations (2.2)- (2.3). 
The MATLAB, version 4.0, 4th and 5th order Runge-Kutta-Fehlberg numerical 
integration method was used. The MATLAB plotting algorithms were used to 
produce the figures. 
In Figures 1 - 3 the initial number of active Reds, Ra(O) = 100; the initial 
number of civilian Reds, Rc(O) = 50; and the initial number of Blue B(O) = 100. In 
all the Figures Blue has perfect classification; that is, iaa = icc= 1. In Figure 1, 
PRB = PBR = 0.1. In Figure 2, PRB = 0.1, PBR = 0.19. In Figure 3, PRB = 0.1, PBR = 
0.20. Note that even though Blue has perfect classification capability, the effort 
that it expends doing the classification puts Blue at a disadvantage when PRB = 
PBR = 0.1. Blue needs to almost double PBR to achieve parity with Red. 
In Figures 4- 5, Ra(O) = 100; Rc(O) =50; PRB = PBR = 0.1; and iaa = icc= 1. In 
order to achieve parity with Red, the initial Blue forces must be nearly 145, a 40% 
increase. 
In Figures 6- 7, Ra(O) = 100; Rc(O) =50; PRB = PBR = 0.1; and icc= 1. However, 
iaa = 0.8. Thus, Blue can mistake active Reds for civilians. In order to achieve 
parity with Red in this case, the initial number of Blues needs to be almost 160. 
Table 1 displays the times until 85% of the initial Red Actives are attrited and 
times until 85% of the Blue forces are attrited. In all cases the initial number of 
Red actives is 100 and the initial number of Red civilians is 50. The parameters 
PRB = PBR = 0.1 Blue always classifies Red civilians correctly; icc= 1. The side that 
reaches 85% of its initial forces first is considered the loser. Even if Blue has 
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perfect classification of active Reds, iaa = 1, Blue needs more than 20 additional 
forces to be the winner when there are 50 Red civilians in the area. If further, Blue 
does not have perfect classification, iaa = 0.8, then Blue needs more than 30 
additional forces to be the winner. 
Table 1. Time Until 85% of Force is Attrited 
50 Red Civilians 
PBR = PRB = 0.1 
Initial Forces 85% of Initial Time Until 85% of Initial 
Forces Force Are Attrited 
iaa Red Blue Red Blue Red Blue Winner 
Actives Actives Actives 
1 100 100 85 85 2.6 1.6 RED 
1 100 110 85 93.5 2.3 1.8 RED 
1 100 120 85 102 2.1 1.9 RED 
1 100 130 85 110.5 1.9 2.2 BLUE 
0.85 100 130 85 110.5 2.4 2.1 RED 
0.85 100 140 85 119 2.2 2.3 BLUE 
To compensate for likely variability of outcome and uncertain% Blue force size to 
guarantee winning will very likely be much larger than in the above table. 
3. Alternative Seeker-Attriter Conflict Formulations 
A more realistic, but also more complex problem formulation explicitly 
distinguishes between blue Seekers and Blue Actives: the former locate Red 
units, while the latter attack/ attrit those Reds detected and then identified 
(possibly incorrectly) as Actives. We define 
Raj(t) = number of Red actives that are free (undetected by Blue) at timet; 
Rad(t) = number of Red actives that are detected by Blue at time t; 
Rcj(t) = number of Red civilians (or decoys) free at time t; 
Rcd(t) = number of Red civilians (or decoys) detected (erroneously) at t; 
B5(t) = number of Blue seekers at time t; 
Ba(t) = number of Blue actives at time t. 
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Various issues add to the modeling choices possible; we explore examples only. 
Specifically, here Blue Seekers are modeled as detectors of Reds, but not as 
follower-trackers: once a Blue Seeker makes contact with a Red it puts it into a 
"detected pool" that is available for Blue Active attack, but the Blue Seeker 
becomes quickly free again. A plausible alternative is that a Blue Seeker identifies 
and labels and binds to a Red until the latter is attacked or released. We 
arbitrarily omit consideration of this option for the present. 
There follow the state transition equations. 
dRat= 
dt -~BR(a)Rat(t)B5 (t) + A.at(a)Raa(t) 
'-----v------' 
Free Active Reds Detected Detected Active Reds' 




J; ( ) () () 'l ( ) ( ) Raa(t)iaa B (t) ( ) 
':IBR a Rat t Bs t -~ -PBR Raa(t)+Rca(t) a 3.2 
dRq(t) 
dt 
Free Active Reds Detected Detected Active 
Reds freed 
-~BR ( c )Ret(t)B5(t) + A. at( c )Red (t) 
'----v-----' 
Ovilian/Decoy Ovilian/Decoy 




dR~a(t) = ~BR(c)Ref(t)B5 (t)- A.at(c)Rea(t) - PBR ~e)(t)iea ( ) Ba(t) (3.4) t '----v-----' Raa t + Rea t 
Civilian/Decoy Civilian/Decoy 
Red Detected Red Track Lost Detected Civilian/Decoy 
Red Attrited (Mistakenly) 
di?) = -PRB(s)(Rat(t)+ RaaU)) (3.5) 
Blue Seeker attrited by 
Red Actives 
dB:?) = -PRB(a)(Rat(t) + Raa(t)) 




The condition that all state variables be non-negative must be respected when 
solving (3.1)- (3.6); numerical solution is the only practical option. The rate 
parameters are self-explanatory; if desired any or all of these may be made time-
dependent. 
4. Summary Discussion 
The simple models proposed above account in an explicit way for a 
significant combat phenomenon: the influence of false targets or decoys upon a 
(Blue) combatant's attritional effectiveness. They incorporate discrimination 
power (probability) parameters (iaa, icc) that represent the capacity of Blue to 
correctly identify Red decoys, or, in another interpretation, the capacity of Red to 
confuse and divert Blue. It is hoped that our paper will stimulate further 
investigation in this important military area, which is of considerable current 
interest: it investigates a specific aspect of what is presently called Information 
Warfare. 
A referee has observed a similarity between this paper's models and those 
previously introduced by Taylor (1980), and subsequently discussed by Roberts 
and Conolly (1992). The similarity is that the latter model also stipulates two 
force types (analogous to our Red, however, for them both are active and 
attrition-capable), vs. one (our Blue). But our emphasis differs in that explicit 
attention is paid to the uncertainty with which the single force (our Blue) can 
actually determine which Red force type element is currently a possible target. 
Discrimination parameters (alternatively, a confusion matrix) are introduced to 
explicitly represent the degree with which the Blue force can avoid being tricked 
by Red. This feature might desirably be introduced into the Taylor-Roberts and 
Conolly models; as they now stand (see (1) of Roberts and Conolly) their 
formulation takes no explicit account of which Red type Blue is likely to be 
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targeting; on a modem battlefield this could be an important issue. Optimization 
could be carried out with respect to real-time targeting as well as by choice of 
initial force size. 
We thank Bruce W. Fowler (MICOM) and Lowell Bruce Anderson (IDA) for 
useful discussions. Model oversimplifications and deficiencies are entirely the 
responsibility of the authors. 
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Number of Active Forces Remaining 
rhobr=rhorb=0.1 
iaa=icc=1.0 
initial number of active reds=1 00 
initial number of civilian reds=50 
initial number of blues=1 00 
solid=number of active reds remaining 
dotted=number of blues remaining 
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Number of Active Forces Remaining 
initial number of active reds=1 00 
initial number of civilian reds=50 
initial number of blues=1 00 
rhobr=0.19 rhorb=0.1 
iaa=icc=1.0 
solid=number of active reds remaining 
dotted=number of blues remaining 
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Number of Active Forces Remaining 
initial number of active reds=1 00 
initial number of civilian reds=50 
initial number of blues=1 00 
rhobr=0.2 rhorb=0.1 
iaa=iCC=1.0 
solid=number of active reds remaining 
dotted=number of blues remaining 
- - -
- - - -
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initial number of blues=140 
initial number of active reds=1 00 
initial number of civilian reds=50 · 
rhobr=0.1, rhorb=0.1 
iaa=icc=1.0 
solid=number of active reds remaining 
dotted=number of blues remaining 
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initial number of blues=145 
initial number of active reds=1 00 
initial number of civilian reds=50 
rhobr=0.1, rhorb=0.1 
iaa=icc=1.0 
solid=number of active reds remaining 
dotted=number of blues remaining 
- - -
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initial number of blues=155 
initial number of active reds=1 00 
initial number of civilian reds=50 
rhobr=rhorb=0.1 
iaa=0.8 icc=1.0 
solid=number of active reds remaining 
dotted=number of blues remaining 
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initial number of blues=160 
initial number of active reds=1 00 
initial number of civilian reds=50 
rhobr=rhorb=0.1 
iaa=0.8 icc=1.0 
solid=number of active reds remaining 
dotted=number of blues remaining 
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